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Speak Out Your Risk: Dialectal Effects on Merger Decisions 
 
Abstract 
The “biological code” of a language can be measured by tone patterns and pitch heights, 
which are recognized to foster and promote certain personal traits like self-confidence and 
risk tolerance. Guided by linguistic and financial research, this study examines the impact of 
Chinese dialects on CEOs’ merger decisions. We hypothesize that CEOs in China who speak 
different dialects may have different tendencies to engage in risky activities, like mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As). Results suggest that CEOs who speak dialects with fewer rising tones 
and higher pitch are more likely to undertake M&As, while CEOs who speak dialects with 
more rising tones and lower pitch are less likely to undertake M&As. The results are robust to 
various specifications, including the impact of local economic and regional cultural factors. 
Additionally, firms’ performances after M&As are evaluated. The results suggest that CEOs’ 
overconfidence and high-risk tolerance are likely to cause M&As to be less successful in the 
long run. 
 
 
Keywords: language; dialect; mergers and acquisitions; risk-taking behavior 
JEL Classification: G31, G34, Z13 
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1 Introduction 
Language plays an important role in determining an individual’s social and economic 
outcomes (Chiswick and Miller, 2001). The well-known linguistic relativity hypothesis, also 
known as the Sapir–Whorf Hypothesis (SWH), posits that the structure of a language may 
shape its speakers’ representations of reality (e.g., Whorf and Chase, 1956). A recent study by 
M. K. Chen (2013) shows that differences in language explain a series of variations in 
economic behaviors across individuals from different countries. A follow-up question is 
whether these language effects also carry over to behaviors in the corporate domain. This 
paper focuses on one aspect of corporate decisions-merger and acquisition (M&A) 
decision-making. 
According to SWH, an individual’s thoughts and actions are determined by the 
language(s) that individual speaks. A weaker form of the SWH argues that language 
heterogeneity may affect non-linguistic behaviors without controlling cognitive processes. 
Following this line of linguistic research, we hypothesize that the intonation pattern of 
language influences individual risk-taking behavior, and we are particularly interested in the 
relationship between the uses of rising tone and pitch height in a language, and the speaker’s 
risk preference. To measure one’s risk preference, we use the M&A decisions made by the 
chief executive officer (CEO) because engaging in M&A activities is considered risky 
behavior (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993), and CEO personal traits have significant impact on 
firm decision-making (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). Previous literature has extensively studied 
the association between the CEO’s overconfidence and corporate behavior and performance; 
however, none investigates the impact of the language they speak. This study fills the gap by 
examining how language influences CEOs’ merger decision-making through the intonational 
pattern of the languages they speak. 
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Though Mandarin is an official language in China, different dialects are widely used in 
Chinese daily lives.
1
 In the present study, we pay special attention to whether the dialect that 
a CEO speaks influences his or her willingness to engage in M&As, and whether the impact 
exists even after the CEO has moved to a region with a different dialect. More specifically, 
we are interested in the following questions. First, do dialectal variations explain the 
differences in merger decision-making of listed Chinese companies? If so, what is the 
possible mechanism that links the language structure and individual behaviors? Second, we 
evaluate firms’ short- and long-term performances in relation to the dialectal variation of 
CEOs who have engaged in M&A activities. Detailed information on companies’ financial 
activities, and CEOs’ personal attributes, come from the CSMAR and Wind economic 
databases allows us to examine the impact of dialects on CEOs’ M&A decision-making. 
As will be discussed later, linguistic and psychology research suggests that higher 
pitched voices have a “frequency code” that seems to promote and reinforce certain personal 
characteristics like self-confidence, aggression, and supremacy. As a consequence, these 
attributes make speakers of languages with higher pitched voices more likely to engage in 
risky activities (Ohala, 1984). Similarly, the tone of voices determines the speakers’ 
perception of certainty or deference (Tench, 2015). Falling tone seems to consolidate 
certainty, domination, and power; and rising tone may boost uncertainty, insecurity, and lack 
of confidence (Verdugo, 2005). Therefore, speakers of languages with more falling tones or 
less rising tones are more likely to have high risk tolerance (Lai, 2010). Consistent with 
linguistic research, we find that CEOs who speak Xiang or Gan (both dialects have higher 
pitch levels and fewer rising tones) are more likely to execute a merger than a CEO who 
speaks Mandarin. In contrast, CEOs who speak Min or Jin (both dialects have lower pitch 
levels and greater rising tones) are less likely to be involved in an M&A. The effects are 
statistically significant, economically sizable, and do not attenuate even after we control for 
                                                     
1
 According to Survey Data of Linguistic Usage in China (2016), 86.38% of Chinese people speak in 
dialects with others. 
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industry composition differences or for an extensive set of firm- and industry-level control 
variables. Our results are still robust when geographic variations in the firm’s location of 
registration and regional cultural factors are controlled. Furthermore, to alleviate the potential 
bias arising from the place of upbringing, which may not be the same place as the place of 
birth, we use the place of Hukou registration as an alternative measure of CEOs’ dialects, and 
the results remain the same.
2
 
We also report results from other empirical approaches. First, utilizing the propensity 
score matching (PSM) approach, we find that, within the Gan and Xiang dialectal regions, 
companies where the CEO speaks the native dialect conduct more M&As than those where 
the CEO speaks a non-native dialect. Second, within the Min and Jin dialectal regions, 
companies where the CEO speaks the native dialect are less likely to be involved in M&As 
than those where the CEO speaks non-native dialects. These two findings suggest that 
language effects on M&As cannot be reinforced for people who migrated into Gan and Xiang 
(or Min and Jin), and cannot be attenuated for people who migrated out once their preferences 
on M&As were formed. Third, across regions with different dialects, companies with Gan- 
and Xiang-speaking CEOs have a higher rate of taking over in M&As than CEOs who speak 
other dialects. We also extend our analysis by comparing the short- and long-term 
performance between firms with CEOs who speak different dialects based on the event study 
approach. The results show that long-term performance is significantly lower when a CEO 
speaks Gan or Xiang, which conveys their overall overconfidence and high risk tolerance.  
Our contribution to the existing research is trifold. First, this study relates to a recent 
research line on economic effects of language (e.g., M. K. Chen, 2013), and our focus differs 
in that we study regional variations of the same language. We add to this literature by 
showing that language affects economic outcomes at various levels even within the same 
                                                     
2
 Based on the place of birth, the Hukou system gives Chinese citizens the legal right to permanently 
reside in a province or city in China. It is very difficult for an individual to change his or her place of 
Hukou registration. Chinese citizens are allowed to migrate to areas where they do not have permanent 
residence permit. However, using the Hukou registration system, Chinese authorities can distinguish 
between local Hukou and non-local Hukou. 
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country. Our results suggest that, even on a much finer geographic scale, regional variation of 
dialects still affects people’s economic behavior. Second, to the best of our knowledge, this 
study is the first to introduce the intonational mechanism in economic decision-making. 
While current literature interprets the influence of language on the economic decision from 
the perspective of its grammatical distinction between future and present events (e.g., S. Chen 
et al., 2017) few studies focus on the intonational structures of language. The novelty of our 
study is the use of tone patterns and pitch heights to analyze the internal mechanism of 
dialects on merger decisions, which, in turn, deserves more attention at the corporate 
decision-making level. Third, understanding the driving factors of M&A decisions is 
important in corporate finance (e.g., Hilary and Hui, 2009; Walters et al., 2007). Our study 
contributes a new perspective by examining the differences in CEOs’ languages. While many 
studies on M&As emphasize the importance of communication in reducing employee 
resistance or achieving effective integration (e.g., Schweiger and Denisi, 1991), few address 
how language affects motivations or incentives for M&As. This study bridges the gap by 
examining the impact of CEOs’ dialects on their risk preferences. Recognizing the diversity 
in regional dialects is informative for a company when hiring a valuable CEO who speaks a 
certain dialect. 
The remaining study is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the linguistic hypothesis. 
Section 3 explains the construction of the dataset, and the classification of dialectal groups. 
Section 4 reports on the empirical evidence and robustness checks. Section 5 extends the 
analysis of dialectal effect on firms’ short- and long-term performance. Section 6 discusses 
the results, and concludes the study. 
 
2 Hypothesis Development 
Language is an essential part of daily life; it conveys knowledge and information through 
communication. However, how language affects an individual’s economic decisions 
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remains largely unexplored, especially regarding empirical evidence. We follow the linguistic 
and psychology research of the impact of intonation on personal traits, especially individual 
uncertainty and self-confidence. 
According to linguistics, spoken language can convey an individual’s uncertainty; it has 
a strong pragmatic layer that can signal how confident individuals are when making decisions 
(Fiedler, 2008). Several studies have linked rising tone to the perception of uncertainty. Ward 
and Hirschberg (1985) concluded that the frequency of rising tone in one’s dialogue conveys 
uncertainty of the speaker. Another study by Lai (2010) looked at the pattern of rising 
intonation in a conversation contour, and how it affects the interpretation of cue words in a 
dialogue. Both cue words and rising intonation indicate a range of speakers’ attitudes, like 
uncertainty when making decisions. On the other hand, voice pitch is shown to signal 
different functions across different languages—high or rising pitch indicates questions, while 
low or falling pitch indicates non-questions; high pitch signals politeness, while low pitch 
indicates assertiveness (Ohala, 1984). Apple et al. (1979) also confirmed that speakers with 
high-pitched voices are considered more risk-taking and ambitious. Another study also 
showed that CEOs with deeper (low-pitched) voices manage larger companies, and a deep 
voice is evolutionarily advantageous for males, and indicates competitive benefits for 
leadership positions (Mayew et al., 2013). Finally, considering the Chinese dialects examined 
in this study, Cheng (1973) found that each dialect is coded with a unique intonation value, 
which comprises a value indicating the numbers of rising tones used in daily conversation, 
and the average pitch height value. Therefore, it makes sense to assume that, with different 
tone patterns and pitch heights, CEOs speaking different dialects may lead to different 
decisions at the corporate level. 
Taken together, the above discussion suggests that voices have biological codes that can 
be measured by tone patterns and pitch heights. It appears that different intonational patterns 
(tone and pitch structures) can promote different personal traits. While high-pitched voices 
are found to promote ambition, dominance, and high tolerance for risk, voices with less rising 
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tones are proven to foster certainty, confidence, and self-esteem in the speaker’s personality. 
Therefore, if M&As are representatives of risky behavior, we propose the following 
hypotheses: 
HYPOTHESIS 1: CEOs who speak different dialects differ in their M&As decisions. 
HYPOTHESIS 2: When speaking a dialect with more rising tones in their conversations, 
CEOs are less likely to conduct an M&A due to their higher level of 
uncertainty. 
HYPOTHESIS 3: If the overall pitch height of a dialect is relatively high, CEOs speaking 
such a dialect are more risk-taking, and therefore, more likely to conduct 
an M&A. 
 
3 Data 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The information on M&A transactions and corporate financial data are drawn from the 
China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) and Wind Economic Databases. 
Similar to COMPUSTAT or CRSP in the United States, CSMAR and Wind provide stock 
prices and accounting data for listed companies in China. To identify a CEO’s dialect, the 
place of birth is used; additionally, his (her) residential information is used as an alternative 
measurement.
3CEO characteristics and firms’ financial information are also obtained from 
CSMAR and Wind. Our final sample includes 6,101 firm-year observations from 2003 to 
2015.
4
 The reason that we start our analysis from 2003 is that the China Security Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) published the Administrative Rules on the Acquisition of Listed 
                                                     
3
 Since numerous places of birth and residential information are missing from the CSMAR and Wind 
economic databases, we complete our datasets by manually searching for all CEOs’ biographical 
information from different online sources, such as Sina Finance and Baidu Wiki. 
4
 To mitigate the adverse effect of outliers, we winsorize the top and bottom one percentile from all 
continuous variables in our sample. 
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Companies in 2002, and began to implement those rules in the following year. This document 
is considered the most detailed standard for listed firms’ M&A activity in China.5 
Table 1 presents the basic descriptive statistics. Approximately 94.6% of CEOs are male 
CEOs in our sample. With respect to education, 83.2% of CEOs received college or higher 
education. In particular, 36.3% are college graduates (with a bachelor’s degree or above), 
47.1% have some college or an associate degree, while only 16.6% have a high school 
education or less. Almost 89.8% of CEOs in our sample are between the ages of 40 and 60. 
Nearly 45.3% are employed by state-owned enterprises, and they have served for about six 
years in their current positions (Tenure). Slightly more than one-third of the CEOs in our 
sample hold dual positions of executive manager and non-executive chairperson. We also 
break down the sample according to whether any merger has taken place between 2003 and 
2015. Compared to the non-merger group, CEOs who have made at least one merger decision 
are slightly younger and a bit more educated. Nearly 38.2% of CEOs received at least a 
college degree in the merger group, while this ratio is 34.5% for the non-merger group. CEOs 
are less likely to hold both executive and chairman positions in the merger group (Dual). In 
addition, merger companies tend to be somewhat younger and have smaller board members. 
Compared to the non-merger group, CEOs’ equity ratio (CEO share), rate of return on 
common stockholders’ equity (ROE), growth rate of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT 
Growth), and cash holding ratio (Cash Ratio) are substantially lower for the merger group. In 
contrast, the merger group has higher liability to asset ratio (Leverage). 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
3.2 Dialects Classification 
Regional languages or dialects have a long tradition in China. Although some dialects 
are similar, speakers of the national language, Mandarin, have difficulty understanding others 
despite of their similarity. This is similar to how Dutch shares similarities with English, but it 
                                                     
5
 Refer to online appendix for a brief explanation of the variables used in our analysis. 
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is difficult for English-speakers to comprehend. Based on phonetic and grammar differences, 
Chinese languages can be clustered into several sub-dialects (Yuan, 1980). The boundary of 
each sub-dialect corresponds to the sharpest zones of linguistic variation.  
To construct the measure for dialect groups, we refer to the chapter on Chinese Dialects 
in the book Language Atlas of China (LAC) in 1986. According to their definition, the 
Chinese dialects are classified into eight groups, namely, Mandarin, Min, Jin, Gan, Wu, 
Xiang, Yue, and Hakka. Although LAC was updated in 2012 according to the recent change 
in status, our samples mainly focus on CEOs who are older than 40 (nearly 90.92%), whose 
dialect characteristics were formed before 1986. Thus, we use the version published in 1986 
as our reference. CEOs, based on their place of birth at the prefecture city level, are matched 
to different dialect groups according to the map outlined in the LAC. For instance, a CEO, 
whose birthplace is Guangzhou in Guangdong Province, is matched with the Yue dialect 
group according to the LAC. However, a CEO born in Huizhou, another city in Guangdong 
Province, falls into the group of Hakka dialect.
6
 This definition states that the attributes and 
perspectives associated with dialects can be assimilated through cultural exposure and living 
experiences with a given dialect group. This measure also reflects the idea that a CEO’s 
cultural beliefs, economic behaviors, and risk perspectives correlate with those in the location 
where the firm is headquartered, and consequently, where the CEOs spend most of their 
professional time. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
                                                     
6
 The dialect classification used in this study is based on the Language Atlas of China. In Figure 1, we 
show China’s language atlas. 
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4 The Effect of Dialects on Merger Decisions 
4.1 Controlling for CEO Personal Attributes and Firm Heterogeneity 
We start our formal investigation of the impact of CEOs’ dialects on their M&As 
decisions. In our first model, we control for CEOs’ personal attributes as follows: 
𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (1) 
Where 𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 measures M&A decisions for CEO 𝑖 at time 𝑡, and can be 
represented in one of two ways. First,  𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 if an M&A activity taken place, and 0 otherwise. Second, 𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is a continuous 
variable of the number of mergers. Dialect is the variable of interest. As described in the 
previous section, there are eight groups used in our analysis to represent CEO 𝑖’s dialect. 
Since Mandarin is the most commonly spoken language in China, we use it as the reference 
group. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 includes a vector of variables representing individual characteristics of CEO 𝑖 at 
year 𝑡, including age, tenure, and dummy variable, indicating whether the CEO has a college 
degree, among others. 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of variables of firm characteristics. Year and industry 
dummies are controlled in the estimation. 
Results from equation (1) are reported in columns (1) and (4) of Table 2, where only 
personal attributes of CEOs are controlled for. Several findings are worth mentioning in this 
table. First, Gan- or Xiang-speaking CEOs have 23.4% and 17.4% higher chance of 
conducting mergers, respectively. At the same time, CEOs who speak Jin or Min dialects 
have 20% and 15.2% less chances of conducting mergers, respectively. Similar results are 
found when the number of mergers is used as a dependent variable. Second, compared to 
female CEOs, the likelihood of a male CEO undertaking a merger is greater, which is 
consistent with the findings of Levi et al. (2014).
7
 However, this finding is not statistically 
significant, maybe due to the fact that female executives are underrepresented in our sample. 
                                                     
7
 For reasons related to brevity, we only provide some estimates of our variables of interest. Full 
results are available upon request. 
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Third, we also find that age and tenure have significant negative impact on a CEO’s merger 
decision. However, neither the quadratic form of age, nor tenure effect is statistically 
significant. This is slightly different from the findings of Brookman and Thistle (2009), which 
suggests that tenure has an inverse U-shape effect. The disparity is possibly due to the 
average tenure of CEOs, which is five years in our study versus 13 years in their study, 
implying that we may only see a short-term effect. 
Not controlling for heterogeneity at the industry or firm levels could result in biased 
estimates of our coefficients. Therefore, we control for such sources of variation across firms. 
Results are reported in columns (2) and (5) of Table 2. Again, speaking Gan or Xiang dialect 
has a statistically positive effect on a CEO’s decision to merge, while speaking Min or Jin is 
negatively correlated with mergers. The point estimates of dialect effects in column (2) are 
quite similar to those in column (1). From the firm’s perspective, the probability that firms 
with higher ROE ratios, greater assets, dual roles of manager, and higher growth rates will 
undertake mergers is higher. These findings are consistent with previous studies. Finally, we 
control for both CEOs’ personal attributes and firm characteristics. The results are presented 
under columns (3) and (6) of Table 2. They still show that CEOs who speak Gan and Xiang 
(Min and Jin) dialects are more (less) likely to conduct mergers. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
4.2 Controlling for Regional and Cultural Economic Heterogeneity 
Another significant concern with the results reported so far is that the regressions may 
omit variables that capture important economic differences across regions that are related to 
economic growth and frictions in financial markets, and therefore, omit the marginal benefits 
and costs of M&As. In other words, language structure may correlate with one or more 
variables for which our model specification does not account for. Therefore, we take our 
analysis one step further by estimating the regression: 
𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (2) 
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Where 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 includes a vector of regional economic or cultural variables including 
whether the company locates in the capital city, the logarithm of local GDP, logarithm of 
average house expenditure (AHE), and logarithm of Public Expenditure (PE), and local 
resident’s attitude toward risks and social attitude. The definition of other variables in 
equation (2) is similar to those in equation (1). 
The results are presented in Table 3. In columns (1) and (6), we control for whether 
firms are registered in a coastal area because there is geographic–economic inequality 
between inland and coastal areas of China. The point estimates are very similar to our 
baseline model. Columns (2) and (7) control for whether the firm is located in capital cities, 
as capital cities of provinces of China typically enjoy more financial recourses, and therefore, 
economic prosperity. The results suggest that the location of the firm, especially whether it is 
located in the capital city, is an important determinant in an M&A decision. Additionally, in 
columns (3) and (8), we control for other macroeconomic factors. Again, the results show that 
our findings have not changed after controlling for these macroeconomic factors. However, 
we document some interesting results on the impact of macroeconomic factors on mergers.
8
 
First, the local housing price has a positive impact on merger decisions. A common belief is 
that housing is an essential sector of the economy, and a strong housing market is positively 
associated with investment. Rising housing prices may indicate an expanding economy, and 
therefore, firm managers are more confident about the performance of the economy, and more 
willing to undertake mergers, as a result of that. Second, the size of population is positively 
associated with merger decisions. A large population provides sufficient labor supply and a 
larger market that has a greater overall demand for goods and services. Third, higher public 
expenditure decreases the likelihood of undertaking mergers. The government may finance 
public spending by increasing both corporate and income taxation, which is likely to reduce 
the profitability of investment, and thus, reduce the possibility of a merger (J. Wang, 2009). 
                                                     
8
 For reasons related to brevity, we only provide estimates of our variables of interest. Full results are 
available upon requests. 
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Language is an integral component of a region’s culture (e.g., Stulz and Williamson, 
2003), but we want to rule out other cultural effects that may be responsible for our 
findings.
9
Therefore, we control for several measures of regional culture. The results from our 
regional culture analysis are also reported in Table 3. Columns (4) and (9) control for 
different geographic cultures. Following Zhang et al. (2015), we classify Chinese geographic 
culture into four categories: Yangtze River, mountain, grassland, and urban culture. Yangtze 
River drains one-fifth of the land area of China, and its river basin is home to one-third of the 
country’s population. A dummy variable is used to control for whether a firm’s registration 
location is within the Yangtze River region. The results show that people located within the 
Yangtze River region are less likely to perform a merger. As one of the oldest cultures in 
China, people rely on the agriculture and farming industry, and thus, tend to be more 
conservative risk-takers. Other than river cultures, people who live in coastal and more 
urbanized areas are more likely to undertake mergers. China’s policy of creating special 
economic zones (SEZs) has increased urban and economic growth in coastal cities. These 
regions and the SEZs have become core industrial centers that attract numerous investments 
to coastal and urbanized areas. This rapid economic development increases the possibility of 
M&As. Our main finding remains unchanged after controlling for the additional measures of 
regional cultures.  
In columns (5) and (10) of Table 3, we control for another set of regional culture 
measures. Prior studies report a significant relation between trust and economic outcomes 
(Guiso et al., 2004). For example, Guiso et al. (2009) showed that trust between inhabitants of 
different countries is partly explained by the commonality in languages. Personal initiatives of 
entrepreneurs are greatly related to firm’s policy, and thus, influence the performance and 
value of firms (Song et al., 2015). The cultural heterogeneity data was drawn from the China 
                                                     
9
 Economics is currently experiencing a rapid increase in research related to country culture and its 
impact on behavior and decision-making by individuals, as well as corporations. For example, see 
Alesina and Giuliano (2015) and Guiso et al. (2015). 
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Household Finance Survey (CHFS), and the World Value Survey (WVS). Again, results 
reported show that our main findings remain consistent.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
4.3 Alternative Measures and Sample Selection 
As one would notice, an inaccurate measurement of dialect could result in biased 
estimators. Therefore, we consider two alternative measurements of dialect. First, it is 
possible that families would raise their children in different regions than their regions of birth 
because of better job opportunity, and therefore, measuring the dialect actually spoken using 
place of birth may cause estimation bias of our coefficients of interest. Thus, in columns (1) 
and (5) of Table 4, a CEO’s place of Hukou registration is used in order to measure the dialect, 
rather than the birthplace. The reason we use CEO’s Hukou registration place is because of 
the Hukou system’s uniqueness. While people are free to relocate, it is difficult for them to 
change their Hukou from one place to another. Since there is no way to know how well a 
CEO speaks her dialect or how often she speaks it, the place of birth, along with Hukou 
registration place, are used to provide better measurement for the CEO’s spoken dialect. As 
anticipated, using the place of Hukou registration as another proxy for dialects does not have 
a considerable impact on our results. To a great extent, this is likely because of the fact that 
the Hukou system in China greatly restricts labor mobility and movement across different 
dialectal regions.  
Next, we consider a different proxy for dialects, which is the firm’s place of registration. 
Analogous to measuring a CEO’s dialect by his or her place of birth, the dialect of a firm is 
based on the location of the firm’s registered headquarters. If a CEO’s merger decision is not 
related to his or her dialect, but related to the firm’s location, place of registration as a proxy 
for dialects should be statistically significant in our regression. The results presented under 
columns (2) and (6) of Table 4, however, show that none of the coefficients are significant 
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when the firm’s location is used to proxy dialects. This eliminates the possibility that a firm’s 
regional dialect is associated with the decision to merge.  
Our previous findings may also suffer from reverse causality. For example, a company 
with more aggressive management policy is more prone to hiring risk-taking executives. In 
contrast, studies suggest (Jane Lenard et al., 2014; Mathew et al., 2018) that corporations with 
more diverse boards of directors are less prone to take risks than firms with less diverse 
boards. Although we previously controlled for the size of the board, the personal traits of 
board members were not provided in our original dataset. To alleviate this concern, we 
estimate our regression for CEOs who currently work in their current position or have been 
running the same company for at least two years in columns (3) and (7) of Table 4. We 
hypothesize that the behavior of newly hired CEOs may be more aligned with the firm’s 
development and management style, and therefore, we limit our analysis to those who served 
for two or more years in their current positions, and the results are still statistically significant.  
Another econometric concern with our dataset is that our previous estimation is based on 
cross-sectional regression analysis, wherein one firm in one year is treated as one observation, 
and we ignore the consistency of CEOs’ behavior. If each firm-year is considered to be an 
interdependent observation, our previous estimates may be understated (Petersen, 2009). Thus, 
we address this concern by clustering years, and treat each as an observation. The results are 
reported in columns (4) and (8). The signs of the dialect coefficients remain the same, but the 
values differ a bit. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
4.4 Migration and Merger Propensity  
If an individual’s willingness to engage in merger activity links to that individual’s risk 
attitude, our findings indicate that people who speak different dialects show different 
preferences for risk tolerance. However, it is difficult to separate the effects of linguistic 
differences, regional variation, and other unobserved personal traits. In this sub-section, we 
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adopt a propensity score matching (PSM) approach (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), and 
conduct several tests to identify the impact of linguistic differences of regional variations. If 
the difference in two individuals’ merger decisions is the result of regional heterogeneity, this 
difference is likely to disappear or attenuate as this individual migrates across regions. For the 
purpose of implementing our PSM approach, we classify our eight dialect groups into three 
categories—strong, weak, and neutral dialects—based on the signs of the regression 
coefficients. Strong dialects include Gan and Xiang because CEOs who speak one of these 
two dialects are shown to have higher likelihood to conduct M&As. On the other hand, weak 
dialects include Min and Jin because CEOs speaking one of these two dialects are shown to 
have less likelihood to conduct M&As. The other four dialect groups are classified as neutral 
dialects.  
Panel A of Table 5 reports average treatment effects on treated groups (ATTs) for our 
baseline model. For the baseline treatment, we define migration and moving as crossing two 
different dialectal regions. The treated group refers to a CEO who takes a position in a 
dialectal region that is considerably different from their original region, while the control 
group refers to CEOs who were employed in dialectal regions that are the same as their 
original regions. For example, a CEO born in Xiamen, a city located in Min and with a weak 
dialectal region, who takes a position in Guangzhou, a city in a neutral dialectal region, would 
be included in the treatment group. In another case, a CEO born in Beijing and working in 
Chongqing, both cities in a neutral region with the Mandarin dialect, would be included in the 
control group. We use “across movement” as a reference to our treated group, and “within 
movement” as a reference for the control group. For our analysis, we restrict the sample to 
movements either across different dialectal regions or within the same region, but different 
locations. Therefore, our sample does not include the case of a CEO who takes a job in the 
same region. We also apply radius and kernel matching for each sample’s nearest neighbor. 
Matching estimates suggest that a CEO who takes a job in a different dialectal region shows a 
statistically significant higher likelihood of engaging in merger activity than a CEO who did 
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not take a job in a different dialectal region. Moreover, our PSM results indicate that CEOs’ 
propensity to merge is related to migration status, and the propensity to merge of migrating 
CEOs (11.7%) is statistically higher than that of CEOs who stay in the same dialectal region 
(5.8%). 
Furthermore, we consider different types of movements across dialectal regions. In Panel 
B, we test whether moving to strong or weak dialectal regions changes the merger behavior of 
CEOs who speak neutral dialects. The treatment group we used consists of CEOs who speak 
neutral dialects, but work and reside in strong dialectal regions; for example, a CEO who 
comes from a Mandarin region, but moves to the Gan region. The constructed counterfactual 
control group comprises CEOs who speak neutral dialects, and move to a different neutral 
dialectal region. The results suggest that moving out of a neutral dialectal region does not 
change the merger behavior of a CEO whose mother tongue is a neutral dialect.  
We then investigate whether moving out of a strong dialectal region would change the 
merger decision of CEOs who were originally from strong dialectal regions. The results are 
presented in Panel C of Table 5. We first notice that the merger propensity for the treated 
group (migrating CEOs) is higher than that of the baseline model. This confirms that CEOs’ 
moving decisions correlate positively with their attitude toward risk-taking. All matching 
estimates are positive and statistically significant, indicating that migrating from strong 
dialectal regions to other regions does not reduce the propensity to make a merger decision 
for CEOs who originate from strong dialectal regions. In fact, CEOs engage in more 
aggressive risk-taking and merger decisions.  
Finally, Panel D of Table 5 provides the results from comparing the merger likelihood 
between CEOs who move from weak to neutral and strong dialectal regions, and CEOs who 
migrate within weak regions. As expected, negative signs between treated and control groups 
suggest that merger propensity does not increase even when CEOs move out of weak dialectal 
regions. The nearest neighbor matching estimate indicates that migrating CEOs are 13.7% 
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less likely to make merger decisions. In summary, our matching results show that CEOs’ 
attitudes toward M&A decisions remain consistent, and do not change when they migrate to 
other dialectal regions. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
4.5 Mechanism Analysis 
It is difficult to form a general picture of tonal patterns and values of different dialects in 
China. One reason is the methodological inadequacy; languages do not differ along just one 
dimension. One pioneer by Cheng (1973) investigated 737 dialect locations to study majority 
and minority tonal pattern tendencies in China. His quantitative estimates suggest that some 
Southern dialects (such as Xiang, Gan, and Yue) have fewer rising tones and higher pitch 
values than other dialects. Rising tones predominate in most dialects, while falling tones 
occur less frequently than any other tonal contour. Following his study, we encode each 
dialect with a unique intonation value, which consists of a value indicating the number of 
rising tones used in daily conversation and the average pitch height value. On average, the 
number of rising tones in all dialects is 6.43; there are fewer rising tones used in Gan and 
Xiang. In contrast, the highest level of voice pitch is observed in Gan and Xiang dialects, 
while the lowest levels of pitch height are in Jin and Min.
10
 
To test our hypotheses concerning tone patterns and individual risk-bearing behavior, we 
estimate the following model: 
𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖  (𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖) + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖 measures the average number of tone in each dialectal region, 
while 𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖 measures the average pitch in each dialectal region. The variables of individual 
attributes and firm characteristics are the same as in equation (3).  
                                                     
10
 Details of intonation patterns of different dialects are available on the online appendix. 
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Table 6 reports the estimated results of intonation pattern on whether a merger is made, 
and the number of mergers undertaken. As expected, the rising tone has a negative impact on 
CEOs’ merger decisions. In particular, column (1) shows that one additional unit of rising 
tone used is likely to reduce the merger’s probability by 22.5%. Similarly, in column (3) one 
more rising tone reduces the number of mergers by 25.9%. Both effects are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. In the same table, we also show the impact of pitch height on 
merger decision-making. As expected, a higher vocal pitch increases the likelihood of 
undertaking mergers. Specifically, in column (2) we see that, as the pitch height increases by 
one unit, the probability of merger increases by 26.8%. Similarly, results reported in column 
(4) show that, as the pitch height increases by one unit, the number of mergers increases by 
30.3%. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
We further analyze the impact of rising tone and pitch height on other firm and cultural 
variables in Table 7. The reason we are doing this is to test how tone and pitch patterns vary 
when we use different risk measurements. We first run the regressions of cash holding ratio, 
leverage ratio, and firm EBIT growth rate on both tone and pitch height, and the results are 
shown on the top panel of Table 7. The rising tone pattern has negative impact on almost all 
firm variables. It is worth noting that the more rising tones in a dialect, the lower the cash 
holding ratio and lower leverage. This may be due to the fact that the number of rising tones 
is positively associated with the speaker’s internal uncertainty, as suggested by linguistic 
research. On the other hand, we find that pitch height has a statistically positive impact on 
leverage ratio, but a negative impact on cash ratio. As indicated earlier, the pitch height of a 
dialect conveys its speaker’s risk tolerance. At the bottom panel of Table 7, we report test 
results from the impact of tone and pitch on cultural variables. We estimate the regression of 
risk attitude of people who speak the same dialect, their self-reported trust and happiness 
indicators on the variables of tone and pitch. The intonation pattern is statistically correlated 
with different cultural factors. People with dialects that consists of more rising tones are more 
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risk-taking, less likely to trust others, and have somewhat lower level of life satisfaction. 
Similar patterns are shown for people who speak dialects with higher vocal height. Reported 
results in this sub-section again confirm our hypothesis that dialects influence CEOs’ 
economic decisions since, different dialects convey different levels of risk tolerance.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
5 Dialect Effect on Firm’s Performance 
In this section, we examine the impact of M&As on company performance in both the 
short and long run. More specifically, we are interested in knowing if the company’s 
performance, after M&As, varies according to the CEO’s dialect.  
5.1 Short-term Performance  
To test whether a company’s short-term performance is dependent on the CEO’s dialect, 
we adopt an event-study method to examine the timely response of the company’s 
performance. Each event is defined as the announcement day of the M&A decision, which is 
regarded as point-in-time zero (𝑡 = 0). We choose five different event windows to conduct 
our analysis: (-1, +1), (-3, +3), (-5, +5), (-10, +10), and (-15, +15). However, for brevity, we 
only present results from one window (-3, +3).
11
 
Using the rate of return of the A-share index of Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange, we calculate the excess earnings (𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡) of each share by subtracting the 
normal rate of return from the effective rate of return as follows: 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡-𝑅𝑖,𝑡
′ . Lastly, we 
compute the cumulative abnormal rate of return of each share: 𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑡1,𝑡2) =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡1
, where 
𝑡1 and 𝑡2 represent the beginning and ending points of each window. The following 
regression is used to investigate the impact of CEOs’ dialects on their firms’ short-term 
performance: 
                                                     
11
 (-𝑡,+𝑡) represents t days before and after announcement day (t=0). Results from all windows are available on the online appendix. 
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𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (4) 
Where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 represents the five different event windows as described above. Our 
variable of interest in this equation is 𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝, which denotes the strong, neutral, and 
weak dialectal regions with the classification mentioned before. Other control variables 
remain the same as before. We report estimates from equation (4) in Table 8. These results 
show that dialects have a negligible impact on firms’ short-term performances. 
5.2 Long-term Performance  
Next, we move on to analyze the company’s long-term performance. To test a dialect’s 
effect on corporate long-term performance, we estimate the following regression: 
∆𝐿𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (5) 
Where 𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 denotes the dialectal regions as described in the previous 
sub-section. We use two proxies to measure the firm’s long-term performance, ∆𝐿𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡: (1) 
ROE (rate of return on common stockholders’ equity) or (2) EPS (earnings per share). 
Following Cai and Sevilir (2012), we calculate ∆𝐿𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑡 in three ways: ∆𝐿𝑇𝑃𝑡−1.𝑡+1 =
𝐿𝑇𝑃𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝑇𝑃𝑡−1, the difference between one year before and after the merger decision; 
∆𝐿𝑇𝑃𝑡−2,𝑡+2 =
𝐿𝑇𝑃𝑡+1+𝐿𝑇𝑃𝑡+2
2
−
𝐿𝑇𝑃𝑡−1+𝐿𝑇𝑃𝑡−2
2
, the difference between the average of two years 
before and after the merger decision; and similarly we calculate the difference between the 
average of three years before and after the merger decision.  
Table 8 also shows empirical results from equation (5). Again, for brevity, we only 
report the results from the difference between the average of two years before and after the 
merger decision (𝑡 − 2, 𝑡 + 2).12 When ROE is used as a proxy for long-term performance, 
the coefficients of Strong are significantly negative in three model specifications. Although 
CEOs in the strong dialectal regions (Gan and Xiang) are more prone to making merger 
decisions, these decisions are likely to impact the firm’s long-term performance negatively. In 
                                                     
12
 Full results from long-term performance analysis for (𝑡 − 1, 𝑡 + 1), (𝑡 − 2, 𝑡 + 2), and (𝑡 − 3, 𝑡 +
3) are provided on the online appendix. 
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contrast, the coefficients of Weak are positive, but not statistically significant, which means 
that Min- and Jin-speaking CEOs are less likely to engage in M&A activities, and if they do, 
these activities are likely to have a negligible effect on their firms’ long-term performance. 
The effect of dialect on earnings per share (EPS) is also reported. The results are analogous 
and consistent with those of ROE estimations. These results provide further evidence of the 
connection between dialects and CEOs’ M&A decisions. CEOs with strong dialects (Gan and 
Xiang) are shown to have high levels self-confidence and risk tolerance. Supposedly, these 
personal attributes lead to a cognitive bias that causes CEOs to overestimate their managerial 
skills and their ability to select profitable targets (Doukas and Petmezas, 2007). At the same 
time, they tend to underestimate the risk associated with their decisions (Hackbarth, 2008). As 
a result, M&A decisions made by such CEOs are likely to be less successful and lead to poor 
performance in the long-term. However, CEOs have low levels of certainty and risk tolerance, 
which make them less prone to engage in merger activities, and their merger actions are less 
likely to impact their firms’ long-term performance. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
6 Conclusion 
Previous research has suggested an important link between language and economic 
behaviors, but the impact of language on entrepreneurial activities remains unexplored until 
now. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to develop a framework that 
examines the relationship between dialects and merger decisions within a country. Our study 
suggests that executives who speak Xiang or Gan are more likely to perform a merger than a 
CEO who speaks Mandarin. In contrast, CEOs who speak Min or Jin are less likely to be 
involved in an M&A. Analyzing the tone and pitch structure for each dialect allowed us to 
investigate internal mechanisms at play. We found that people who speak dialects with fewer 
rising tones and higher pitch values (like Xiang and Gan) have a higher probability to merge. 
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Consistent with earlier findings from linguistic and psychology research, we find that people 
with higher pitch and less rising tones typically exhibit more certainty, higher self-esteem, a 
higher level of confidence, and therefore, have more tolerance for risk. Accordingly, people 
who speak such dialects are more likely to participate in risk-taking activities, such as M&As. 
Furthermore, we test whether the executive’s merger decision is causally related with 
residential location using the PSM approach. Relocation to different dialectal regions only 
changes the magnitude, but not the direction, of risk attitude. Furthermore, our matching 
results show that CEOs’ propensity to conduct M&As remains consistent and does not change 
when they migrate to other dialectal regions. In addition, we investigate the economic 
consequences of M&As caused by CEOs’ dialects on firms’ short- and long-term 
performances. No M&A remarkably affected the abnormal returns of the firms in the short 
run. However, we found a negative impact on firms’ performances in the long run, which 
could be likely attributed to the CEOs’ overconfidence and ambition for risk-taking. 
This study contributes to emerging research on the effects of language on economic 
behavior, introduces a new explanation for heterogeneity in merger decisions, and informs 
researchers’ understanding of the mechanisms behind it. Our results have important 
implications for policymakers concerning the promotion of Mandarin at the expense of 
linguistic and cultural diversity. Linguists have long been concerned that standard language 
promotes cultural and ethnic assimilation, while opponents argue that languages are 
fundamental resources for both cultural and identity development. Even though dialect use in 
China is far less common than it was centuries ago, and individuals today can communicate in 
Mandarin throughout the country more easily, there are still persistent cultural differences 
across dialectal groups. Our evidence shows that dialect affects individual behavior and 
corporate decision-making, and behavior variation is largely attributed to linguistic diversity. 
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Figure 1: Language Atlas of China 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables All Merger Non-Merger 
Mean S.E. Obs. Mean S.E. Obs. Mean S.E. Obs. 
Male 0.946 0.225 6,101 0.946 0.227 2,273 0.948 0.223 3,828 
Age 49.067 6.737 6,101 48.829 6.557 2,273 49.209 6.838 3,828 
Tenure (in years) 5.923 3.280 6,101 5.899 3.201 2,273 5.937 3.327 3,828 
College 0.833 0.373 6,101 0.842 0.364 2,273 0.827 0.378 3,828 
State-owned Enterprises 0.453 0.498 6,101 0.433 0.496 2,273 0.465 0.499 3,828 
Dual 0.350 0.477 6,101 0.370 0.483 2,273 0.338 0.473 3,828 
CEO Share 4.910 11.992 6,101 5.356 12.289 2,273 4.645 11.805 3,828 
FPS 36.563 15.430 6,101 36.705 15.360 2,273 36.479 15.472 3,828 
Firm Age 15.842 5.455 6,101 15.812 5.286 2,273 15.860 5.554 3,828 
Board Size 9.028 1.974 6,101 8.990 1.988 2,273 9.050 1.965 3,828 
Independent Directors 0.370 0.058 6,101 0.372 0.060 2,273 0.370 0.057 3,828 
Assets (in natural log) 21.753 1.341 6,101 21.918 1.312 2,273 21.655 1.348 3,828 
Leverage 0.473 0.216 6,101 0.483 0.211 2,273 0.467 0.219 3,828 
Cash Ratio 1.028 1.811 6,101 0.979 1.719 2,273 1.057 1.862 3,828 
ROE 0.080 0.136 6,101 0.093 0.124 2,273 0.072 0.142 3,828 
EBIT Growth 0.219 0.532 6,101 0.273 0.565 2,273 0.186 0.508 3,828 
Data Source: CEO personal attributes and firm characteristics come from CSMAR and WIND economic databases from 2003 to 
2015. 
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Table 2: Controlling for CEO Personal and Firm Heterogeneity 
Models (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Merger or Not  Number of Mergers 
Gan 0.234
**
 0.215
**
 0.201
**
  0.277
**
 0.243
**
 0.231
**
 
 (0.098) (0.099) (0.099)  (0.115) (0.114) (0.114) 
Hakka -0.168 -0.207 -0.205  -0.176 -0.206 -0.197 
 (0.142) (0.143) (0.144)  (0.157) (0.156) (0.157) 
Jin -0.200
*
 -0.209
*
 -0.217
**
  -0.218
*
 -0.254
**
 -0.260
**
 
 (0.109) (0.109) (0.110)  (0.122) (0.121) (0.121) 
Min -0.152
**
 -0.132
*
 -0.139
*
  -0.207
**
 -0.165
*
 -0.161
*
 
 (0.075) (0.076) (0.077)  (0.086) (0.085) (0.086) 
Wu 0.077 0.066 0.061  -0.004 -0.019 -0.021 
 (0.047) (0.048) (0.048)  (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) 
Xiang 0.174
**
 0.167
**
 0.163
**
  0.194
**
 0.186
**
 0.179
**
 
 (0.079) (0.079) (0.079)  (0.092) (0.091) (0.091) 
Yue -0.037 0.022 0.012  -0.096 -0.006 -0.020 
 (0.056) (0.058) (0.058)  (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
CEO Personal Traits Yes No Yes  Yes No Yes 
Firm Characteristics No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Observations 6,101 6,101 6,101  6,101 6,101 6,101 
R-Squared - - -  0.036 0.059 0.061 
Chi-squared 218.1 323.2 338.2  - - - 
Note: 1. Data source: CEO and firm characteristics come from CSMAR and WIND databases from 2003 to 2015. 
2. Probit regression is used for models (1) to (3), and OLS regression is used for models (4) to (6).Models (1) and (3) control for 
CEO personal traits, including gender of CEO, age, educational level, and their compensation shares of company’s stock. Models 
(2) and (4) control for firm’s characteristics, firm size, firm age, assets ratio, leverage ratio etc. Models (3) and (6) control for both 
personal and firm characteristics. 
3. Standard Error statistics in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% 
level. 
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Table 3: Controlling for Regional Economic and Cultural Heterogeneity 
Models  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  Merger or Not  Number of Mergers 
Gan  0.215** 0.209** 0.171** 0.226** 0.194*  0.253** 0.247** 0.197** 0.267** 0.257** 
  (0.100) (0.099) (0.090) (0.100) (0.108)  (0.114) (0.114) (0.084) (0.115) (0.126) 
Hakka  -0.174 -0.193 -0.196 -0.261 -0.229  -0.169 -0.171 -0.218 -0.387 -0.175 
  (0.144) (0.144) (0.145) (0.155) (0.152)  (0.157) (0.157) (0.158) (0.269) (0.169) 
Jin  -0.187* -0.214* -0.245** -0.193* -0.224**  -0.198 -0.255** -0.256** -0.225* -0.337** 
  (0.112) (0.110) (0.113) (0.111) (0.120)  (0.124) (0.121) (0.125) (0.122) (0.140) 
Min  -0.118* -0.139* -0.236*** -0.196** -  -0.149* -0.164* -0.226** -0.349*** - 
  (0.058) (0.077) (0.085) (0.095) -  (0.087) (0.086) (0.095) (0.107) - 
Wu  0.045 0.056 -0.008 0.064 0.070  -0.042 -0.032 -0.095 -0.045 -0.028 
  (0.049) (0.048) (0.052) (0.050) (0.068)  (0.056) (0.054) (0.059) (0.057) (0.079) 
Xiang  0.170** 0.156** 0.180** 0.188** 0.201**  0.201** 0.165* 0.193** 0.217** 0.180** 
  (0.080) (0.079) (0.080) (0.081) (0.095)  (0.092) (0.091) (0.091) (0.093) (0.090) 
Yue  0.035 0.029 0.005 -0.047 -0.019  -0.005 0.016 -0.055 -0.210** 0.133 
  (0.059) (0.058) (0.062) (0.081) (0.076)  (0.067) (0.066) (0.069) (0.092) (0.087) 
Coastal Area  Yes No No No No  Yes No No No No 
Capital City  No Yes No No No  No Yes No No No 
Macro Variables  No No Yes No No  No No Yes No No 
Regional Cultures  No No No Yes No  No No No Yes No 
Social Attitudes  No No No No Yes  No No No No Yes 
Observations  6,101 6,101 6,101 6,028 6,101  6,101 6,101 6,101 6,028 6,101 
R-Squared  - - -    0.063 0.064 0.065 0.059 0.061 
Chi-squared  349.467 343.101 362.091 328.174 339.506  - - -   
Note: 
1. Data source: CEO personal attributes and firm characteristics come from CSMAR and WIND economic databases from 2003 to 2015.  
2. Probit regression is used for models (1) to (5), and OLS regression is used for models (6) to (10). Models (1) and (6) control for whether the registration firm is located in coastal or 
inland cities. Models (2) and (7) control for whether the registration firm is located in the capital city. Models (3) and (8) control for macroeconomic variables including local GDP, 
public expenditure, and regional income level etc. Models (4) and (9) control for different regional cultures, including Yellow River and Yangtze River culture, Snow area and Mountain 
culture, Grasslands and Oasis culture, and Ocean and Urban culture. Models (5) and (10) control for social attitude toward risk and trust between others. 
3. Standard Error statistics in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4: Alternative Measures of Dialects and Sample Selection 
Models  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Mergers or Not  Number of Mergers 
  
CEO’s Hukou 
Place 
Firm’s Registration 
Place 
CEO tenure≥2 Firm Sample  
CEO’s Hukou 
Place 
Firm’s Registration 
Place 
CEO tenure≥2 Firm Sample 
Gan  0.208
**
 0.190 0.220
**
 0.366**  0.239
**
 0.025 0.245
**
 0.344* 
  (0.098) (0.128) (0.101) (0.262)  (0.112) (0.148) (0.117) (0.681) 
Hakka  -0.203 0.161 -0.180 -0.078  -0.194 0.151 -0.179 -0.973 
  (0.144) (0.201) (0.146) (0.340)  (0.157) (0.230) (0.162) (1.011) 
Jin  -0.215
**
 -0.215
*
 -0.322
***
 -0.334**  -0.257
**
 -0.184 -0.327
***
 -0.925* 
  (0.110) (0.220) (0.114) (0.162)  (0.121) (0.130) (0.125) (0.520) 
Min  -0.138
**
 -0.047 -0.162
**
 -0.349*  -0.166
**
 -0.073 -0.178
**
 -1.627** 
  (0.045) (0.078) (0.079) (0.202)  (0.084) (0.088) (0.089) (0.674) 
Wu  0.072 0.042 0.032 0.036  -0.006 0.001 -0.038 0.405 
  (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.106)  (0.055) (0.054) (0.056) (0.332) 
Xiang  0.169
**
 0.049 0.171
**
 0.353*  0.200
**
 0.063 0.145 1.292** 
  (0.081) (0.107) (0.082) (0.191)  (0.093) (0.122) (0.095) (0.545) 
Yue  0.008 -0.008 0.002 0.195  -0.015 0.010 -0.023 -0.020 
  (0.058) (0.049) (0.059) (0.133)  (0.065) (0.155) (0.067) (0.400) 
Year Dummy  Yes Yes Yes No  Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations  6,028 6,101 5,796 1,146  6,028 6,101 5,796 1,146 
R-Squared  - - - -  0.059 0.061 0.062 0.013 
Chi-squared  328.174 339.506 340.463 128.600  - - - - 
Note: 1. Data source: CEO personal attributes and firm characteristics come from CSMAR and WIND economic databases from 2003 to 2015. 
     2. Probit regression is used for models (1) - (4), OLS regression is used for models (5) - (8). CEO’s Hukou registration place is used to measure his or her dialectal region in (1) and (5).   
       Firm’s registration place is used to measure the dialectal region that the firm belongs to in (2) and (6). CEO in the same position (tenure) at least 2 years are used in the subsample of    
       Model (3) and (7) includes. Columns (4) and (8) show results from pooled year and firm sample for all CEO. 
 3. Standard Error statistics in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5: Estimates of ATTs for Different Identifications 
  Treated Control Difference S.E. 
Panel A: The effect of moving to different dialectal regions 
Nearest Neighbor 0.421 0.304 0.117
**
 0.043 
Caliper 0.421 0.364 0.057
**
 0.020 
Kernel 0.421 0.345 0.076
**
 0.034 
     
Panel B: The effect of moving to strong or weak dialectal regions 
Nearest Neighbor 0.426 0.392 0.034 0.112 
Caliper 0.426 0.357 0.069
*
 0.037 
Kernel 0.426 0.356 0.069 0.099 
     
Panel C: The effect of moving out of strong dialectal regions 
Nearest Neighbor 0.457 0.373 0.083
*
 0.049 
Caliper 0.457 0.367 0.089
**
 0.030 
Kernel 0.457 0.391 0.065
*
 0.036 
     
Panel D: The effect of moving from weak to neutral and strong dialectal regions 
Nearest Neighbor 0.353 0.490 -0.137
**
 0.070 
Caliper 0.353 0.393 -0.040 0.039 
Kernel 0.349 0.430 -0.081
*
 0.049 
Note: Standard error statistics in parentheses. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 
1% level. 
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Table 6: The Impact of Tones and Pitch Heights on Mergers 
Models  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
  Merger or Not  Number of Mergers 
Rising Tone  -0.225*** -  -0.259*** - 
  (0.056) -  (0.064) - 
       
Pitch Height  - 0.268
***
  - 0.303
***
 
  - (0.067)  - (0.076) 
Observations  6,101 6,101  6,101 6,101 
R-Squared  - -  0.061 0.060 
Chi-squared  333.686 331.315  - - 
Note: 
1. Data source: CEO personal attrition and firm characteristics come from CSMAR and WIND economic databases from 2003 
to 2015. Tone and Pitch measurement are based on Cheng (1973). 
2. Other control variables include CEO personal traits, firm characteristics, regional economic variables, regional cultural 
factors, and industry and year dummies. 
3. Standard Error statistics in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 
1% level. 
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Table 7: The Impact of Tone and Pitch on Firm and Social Effects 
  Rising Tone  Pitch Height 
Firm Dependent Variables     
Cash Ratio  -0.128
**
  1.495 
  (-2.064)  (1.368) 
Leverage Ratio  -0.014
**
  0.275
**
 
  (-2.022)  (2.334) 
EBIT Growth  0.007  -0.099 
  (0.317)  (-0.259) 
Cultural Dependent Variables     
Risk Attitude  0.022
**
  -0.124 
  (2.217)  (-0.809) 
Trust  0.063
***
  -0.693
***
 
  (11.094)  (-7.808) 
Happiness  0.111
***
  -1.552
***
 
  (17.721)  (-15.942) 
Note: 
1. Data source: CEO personal attrition and firm characteristics come from CSMAR and WIND economic databases from 
2003 to 2015. Tone and Pitch measurement are taken from F. Wang (2003). Social Attitude, Trust and Happiness 
measurement come from China Household Finance Survey (CHFS), 2011, and World Values Survey (WVS), 2007. 
2. Other control variables include CEO personal traits, firm characteristics, regional economic variables, regional cultural 
factors, and industry and year dummies. 
3. Standard Error statistics in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 
1% level. 
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Table 8: Firm’s Performance by Dialectal Regions 
Models Short-Run Performance  Long-Run Performance 
 CAR(-3,+3)  △ROE(t-2,t+2) △EPS(t-2,t+2) 
Strong Dialect Regions -0.003  -0.065
**
 -0.135
***
 
 -0.006  -0.031 -0.048 
Weak Dialect Regions -0.009  0.036 0.008 
 -0.007  -0.033 -0.052 
Observations 2,507  1,583 1,575 
R-Squared 0.024  0.022 0.106 
Note: 
1. Data source: CEO personal attributes and firm characteristics come from CSMAR and WIND economic databases 
from 2003 to 2015.  
2. CAR(-3,+3) is cumulative abnormal rate of return for the event window (-3, +3).  
3. Based on the Regression Results in Section 4, positive dialectal regions refer to the positive dialect effect on merger 
and acquisition decisions (M&As), and regions of Xiang and Gan dialects are included, while negative dialectal 
regions refer to the negative dialect effect, and in particular includes the regions speaking Min and Jin. The reference 
dialectal regions are the regions have insignificant effects on M&As, including regions of Hakka, Mandarin, Wu, and 
Yue.  
4. Other control variables include CEO personal traits, firm characteristics, regional economic variables, regional 
cultural factors, and industry and year dummies. 
5. Standard Error statistics in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at 
the 1% level. 
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Highlights 
 
 The study examines the relationship between language and merger decisions. 
 CEOs who speak Gan or Xiang dialect are more likely to undertake mergers. 
 CEOs who speak Min or Jin are less likely to engage in merger activities.  
 Dialects with fewer tones or higher pitch have a higher merger probability.  
 Mergers caused by CEOs who speak Gan or Xiang reduce firm’s long-term 
performance. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
